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INTUITION VERSUS ALGORITHM:  
THE CASE OF FORENSIC AUTHORSHIP 
ATTRIBUTION 
Lawrence M. Solan* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On November 6, 2012, Barack Obama was reelected 
President of the United States, having defeated his Republican 
opponent, Mitt Romney. The vote in the Electoral College—the 
official body that votes on a state-by-state basis—was decisive: 
332–206.1 Obama also won the national popular vote by a 
margin of about 4,850,000 votes (50.9% to 47.1%).2 But 
Obama’s winning by a comfortable margin is not what many of 
the pundits on television were predicting. Some announced that 
Romney would win the election, including predictions that he 
                                                          
* Don Forchelli Professor of Law, and Director, Center for the Study of 
Law, Language and Cognition, Brooklyn Law School. My thanks to Silvia 
Dahmen, Lorna Fadden, Roger Shuy and Ben Zimmer for valuable comments 
on earlier drafts, and to the participants in the Authorship Attribution 
Workshop held at Brooklyn Law School in October 2012, sponsored by the 
National Science Foundation. This article is a substantially expanded and 
revised version of my commentary, Ethics and Method in Forensic 
Linguistics, PROC. INT’L ASS’N FORENSIC LINGUISTS’ TENTH BIENNIAL 
CONF., 2012, at 362, available at http://www.forensiclinguistics.net/iafl-10-
proceedings.pdf. Research on this article was sponsored by a Dean’s Summer 
Research Stipend from Brooklyn Law School. 
1 2012 Electoral College Results, NARA, http://www.archives.gov/ 
federal-register/electoral-college/2012/election-results.html (last visited Apr. 
6, 2013). 
2 2012 Presidential Election, NARA, http://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/electoral-college/2012/popular-vote.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2013). 
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would win by a landslide.3 Most guessed that the election would 
be much closer than it turned out to be. 
If the television pundits were all over the lot and mostly 
wrong, those who used sophisticated computational techniques to 
draw inferences from polls fared much better. An article in the 
New York Times shortly after the election put it this way: 
 It was not on any ballot, but one of the biggest 
election contests this week pitted pundits against 
pollsters. It was a pitched battle between two self-assured 
rivals: those who relied on an unscientific mixture of 
experience, anecdotal details and “Spidey sense,” and 
those who stuck to cold, hard numbers. 
 When the results were tabulated, it became clear that 
data had bested divination.4 
Perhaps most prominent among the pollsters was New York 
Times blogger Nate Silver. As of the morning of the election, 
his “FiveThirtyEight” blog predicted that Obama would receive 
313 electoral votes to Romney’s 225, and that Obama had a 
90.9% chance of winning the election.5 Silver also predicted that 
Obama would win the popular vote by 2.5 percentage points.6 
He underestimated the margin of victory slightly in each 
measure, but not by much, and did dramatically better than did 
the pundits. Silver’s success made him a celebrity of sorts, 
including an appearance on The Daily Show with Jon Stewart.7 
                                                          
3 See Benny Johnson, Romney Landslide: Here Are the Biggest Names 
Predicting It, THEBLAZE.COM (Nov. 4, 2012, 3:37 PM), 
http://www.theblaze.com/stories/romney-landslide-here-are-the-biggest-
names-predicting-it-how-it-will-happen/. Among such predictors were Dick 
Morris, Karl Rove, Larry Kudlow, Joe Scarborough, and George Will. For 
quotes from these pundits, see id. 
4 Michael Cooper, Election Result Proves a Victory for Pollsters and 
Other Data Devotees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, at P8. 
5 Nate Silver, FiveThirtyEight: When Internal Polls Mislead, a Whole 
Campaign May Be to Blame, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2012), 
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/01/when-internal-polls-
mislead-a-whole-campaign-may-be-to-blame/. 
6 Id. 
7 The Daily Show with Jon Stewart (Comedy Central television broadcast 
Nov. 7, 2012), available at http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/wed-
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His book The Signal and the Noise is a tribute to the triumph of 
algorithm over intuition.8 
It would be a mistake, however, to dismiss intuitive expert 
judgment generally, just because it fails at predicting the results 
of presidential elections. Not all expert opinion based upon 
experience can be reduced to “divination.” Through repeated 
experience, people develop expertise of all kinds, ranging from 
chess playing9 to medical diagnosis.10 No one accuses the best of 
such people of using a divining rod simply because they do not 
rely on computer algorithms. Moreover, we make judgments all 
the time about what is likely to happen next, including, for 
example, the judgment that it is safe to cross the street when the 
traffic signal favors us and the cars are all stopped. Most of the 
time, there is no computer algorithm with which we can 
compare our rate of success, but we have a good sense—
confirmed by repeated experience—that we are making the right 
decision.  
On the other hand, the use of algorithms seems to neutralize 
some obvious biasing factors that plague the pundits routinely. 
Why is it that experts paid by Fox News (a Republican-oriented 
network) predicted a Romney victory, whereas those paid by 
MSNBC (a Democrat-oriented network) predicted that Obama 
would win? One possibility is that most of the pundits are 
sufficiently corrupt to misstate their actual views if they are paid 
enough to do so. More likely, though, their prior commitments 
contribute to what information they regard as significant and 
color their analyses, which are sincere. This phenomenon, called 
confirmation bias, is well studied by psychologists. It is an 
                                                          
november-7-2012/nate-silver.  
8 See generally NATE SILVER, THE SIGNAL AND THE NOISE (2012) 
(investigating how statisticians distinguish meaningful indicators in ever-
increasing amounts of data in order to make accurate predictions). 
9 Fernand Gobet & Neil Charness, Expertise in Chess, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF EXPERTISE AND EXPERT PERFORMANCE 523, 532–
34 (K. Anders Ericsson et al. eds., 2006). 
10 Geoff Norman et al., Expertise in Medicine and Surgery, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF EXPERTISE AND EXPERT PERFORMANCE, supra 
note 9, at 339, 350. 
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“unwitting selectivity in the acquisition and use of evidence.”11 
The networks engage just those experts whose views are most 
likely to reinforce the views of their audience. Similarly, why is 
it that the television networks so routinely predicted a close 
election? Could it be relevant that these privately-owned media 
outlets make their living selling audiences to advertisers, and it 
is in their interest to maintain electoral drama for as long as is 
feasible? No doubt confirmation bias plays a role here as well. 
With the election in mind, let us move to forensic authorship 
attribution. In his essay on the current state of the field, 
Professor Ronald Butters reminds us, with insight and candor, 
that forensic linguists, like practitioners in most areas of forensic 
science, have done more to advance their field substantively than 
they have done to advance it ethically.12 The program he 
suggests is an ambitious one. Butters complains that forensic 
authorship attribution lacks not only a set of agreed 
understandings about methodology but also lacks, and is in need 
of, standards13 sufficient to ensure the exclusion of bogus 
conclusions based on inadequate data.14 In this regard, Butters 
places methodology beyond mere practice and elevates it to the 
realm of the ethical: it is simply wrong for a profession to go 
about its business without some verification that it is doing a 
good job. Professor Joseph Sanders raises similar points in an 
essay on the ethical duties of expert witnesses more generally.15 
What could be more important than making sure that those 
academics, whose “day jobs” are to seek the truth, do more 
                                                          
11 Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon 
in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998). 
12 Ronald R. Butters, Retiring President’s Closing Address: Ethics, Best 
Practices, and Standards, PROC. INT’L ASS’N FORENSIC LINGUISTS’ TENTH 
BIENNIAL CONF., 2012, at 351–52. The essay is the text of the Presidential 
Address delivered by Professor Butters at the meetings of the International 
Association of Forensic Linguists, Aston University, Birmingham, U.K., July 
2011. 
13 Id. at 352–53, 356. 
14 See id. at 356. 
15 Joseph Sanders, Expert Witness Ethics, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1539, 
1583 (2007) (calling for codes of ethics for individual fields to guide experts 
as to their responsibility in taking an appropriate epistemological stand 
toward their testimony).  
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good than harm when they enter the courtroom with the express 
task of presenting analysis that will affect the lives of others in 
profound ways? 
This essay explores some of the issues that Butters raises in 
the context of forensic authorship attribution analysis and that 
others have raised for some time in the context of other forensic 
sciences that rely on trace evidence.16 My first point is that the 
conflict of interest inherent in expert forensic testimony—
especially by those who make their livings, or at least a 
significant part of their livings, as consulting experts—can 
indeed best be remedied by the development of methods that are 
demonstrably both diagnostic and replicable. For those who rely 
upon judgments of coauthorship based on their knowledge of 
linguistic features and upon a sense that a large cluster of 
differences or commonalities in a particular case cannot be a 
matter of accident, research into methodology should be a top 
priority. Proficiency testing may take the place of the 
development of replicable methods in the short run, but the best 
direction for the field is to demonstrate that methods work and 
are not highly dependent on the skill of the practitioner alone.  
My second point is that work in computer science and 
computational linguistics is moving toward answering many of 
the specific questions that Butters raises about particular 
standards in the field. Such matters as how much data are 
needed for valid conclusions to be drawn are commonplace in 
statistics and modeling, and can easily enough be transported to 
forensic linguistic application. I end this essay with some brief 
conjecture about why the field does not appear to have moved 
ahead quickly with respect to some of these questions and what 
it might do to adjust its course. 
II. LUCY AND LACY: TWO STYLES OF EXPERT ANALYSIS 
Those who engage regularly in expert consultation, and 
especially in expert testimony, have an inherent conflict of 
                                                          
16 See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho 
Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of 
Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1, 27–42 (2002). 
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interest. It is sometimes referred to as the “hired gun” 
syndrome, and it stems from the fact that testifying experts are 
encouraged to render opinions useful to the party that hires them 
and are subject to confirmation bias in any event. Consider the 
following vignette about expert witness Lucy: 
Lucy is a professor of computational linguistics and 
currently has a grant-funded project on authorship 
identification, which she hopes will have practical 
application eventually. Last month, a lawyer phoned 
Lucy, saying he had heard of her work, and asked her if 
she would be willing to apply it to a legal case and 
possibly testify as an expert. Lucy was intrigued. She 
took the case, analyzed it according to the methods that 
she had developed, and concluded, by virtue of applying 
her algorithm, that the questioned document the lawyer 
presented was very unlikely to have been written by the 
person to whose known writings she had compared it. In 
her lab, Lucy was correct 88% of the time when she 
conducted this kind of analysis this way. She told the 
lawyer that she would be happy to testify to all of this, as 
she continues to work in her lab to improve the 88% rate 
of accurate rejection of authorship. 
Now compare Lucy to Lacy: 
Lacy is a forensic linguistic consultant. From time to 
time she takes authorship attribution cases. Lacy does not 
conduct her work computationally. Rather, she has a set 
of thirty-six stylistic markers by which she analyzes all 
documents that come to her. She has found from past 
experience that when the documents are long enough for 
comparison, some of these thirty-six markers will tend 
either to co-occur between a questioned document and a 
reference set or be noticeably different between them. 
There is sometimes controversy about whether her 
testimony will be permitted, but when she is allowed to 
testify, her testimony is generally convincing. 
At first glance, we might prefer Lucy. After all, we know 
how good her methods are, making it less likely that she is a 
hired gun. With Lacy, in contrast, we must rely on her 
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persuasive rhetoric and the intuitive appeal of the data she 
presents.  
Herein lies the problem: we have no idea which expert does 
a better job. It may well be that Lacy limits herself to the kinds 
of problems that she is certain to get right and that her success 
rate exceeds Lucy’s not unimpressive 88%. On the other hand, 
it may be that Lacy gets a lot of slack from her charisma and 
the intuitive appeal of her analyses and that her success rate is 
far lower than Lucy’s.  
Over the past two decades, forensic linguistics, I believe, has 
developed as a field with more Lacys than Lucys, and this has 
led to some of the problems that Butters observes. Many 
involved in the field—especially authorship attribution specialists 
who rely on stylistic markers—conduct little or no laboratory 
work. This is true both of independent consultants and of 
academics who self-identify as forensic linguists. The result is a 
dearth of serious research, provoking reasonable questions about 
the legitimacy of the conclusions reached. As noted below, 
proficiency testing may be at least a partial solution to this 
problem, but no such testing currently takes place. At the same 
time, somewhat disconnectedly, computer scientists and 
computational linguists have been developing algorithms that 
more and more successfully predict authorship, but much of this 
has not yet made its way to forensic application.17 
This tension was not always so pronounced. The history of 
“voiceprint” analysis provides quite a different story. During the 
1960s, an employee of Bell Labs, which invented the sound 
                                                          
17 For the state of current research, see Shlomo Argamon & Moshe 
Koppel, A Systemic Functional Approach to Automated Authorship Analysis, 
21 J.L. & POL’Y 299 (2013); Moshe Koppel et al., Authorship Attribution: 
What’s Easy and What’s Hard?, 21 J.L. & POL’Y 317 (2013); Efstathios 
Stamatatos, On the Robustness of Authorship Attribution Based on Character 
N-Gram Features, 21 J.L. & POL’Y 421 (2013). For an overview, see Carole 
E. Chaski, Author Identification in the Forensic Setting, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND LAW 489 (Peter M. Tiersma & Lawrence M. 
Solan eds., 2012); Patrick Juola, Authorship Attribution, 1 FOUND. & 
TRENDS IN INFO. RETRIEVAL 233 (2008). For general discussion, see 
Lawrence M. Solan, The Expert Witness Meets the Adversarial System, in 
THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC LINGUISTICS 395 (Malcolm 
Coulthard & Alison Johnson eds., 2010). 
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spectrograph, began to make extravagant claims about the ability 
of such devices to distinguish one voice from another, much the 
way fingerprints were (and still largely are) seen as 
distinguishable from one person to the next.18 Police laboratories 
received training in the use of the new technology, about which 
there was considerable excitement.19 Then, in 1979, the National 
Research Council issued a devastating report, pointing out that 
there had not been adequate testing to determine how well 
spectrography can be used to distinguish one voice from the 
other in forensic settings.20 The report noted: 
 The degree of accuracy, and the corresponding error 
rates, of aural-visual voice identification vary widely 
from case to case, depending upon several conditions 
including the properties of the voices involved, the 
conditions under which the voice samples were made, the 
characteristics of the equipment used, the skill of the 
examiner making the judgments, and the examiner’s 
knowledge about the case. Estimates of error rates now 
available pertain to only a few of the many combinations 
of conditions in real-life situations. These estimates do 
not constitute a generally adequate basis for a judicial or 
legislative body to use in making judgments concerning 
the reliability and acceptability of aural-visual voice 
identification in forensic applications.21  
The leaders in the effort to make sure that linguistic science, 
if used in law enforcement efforts, would meet the high 
standards of science itself were chiefly academic linguists, with 
                                                          
18 See Lawrence G. Kersta, Voiceprint Identification, 196 NATURE 1253, 
1257 (1962). For discussion of this history, see LAWRENCE M. SOLAN & 
PETER M. TIERSMA, SPEAKING OF CRIME: THE LANGUAGE OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 140, 140–46 (2005) and Lawrence Solan & Peter Tiersma, Hearing 
Voices: Speaker Identification in Court, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 373, 416–26 
(2003).  
19 See SOLAN & TIERSMA, supra note 18, at 140. 
20 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., ON THE THEORY 
AND PRACTICE OF VOICE IDENTIFICATION 58 (1979). 
21 Id. at 60. 
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special efforts by the distinguished phonetician, Peter 
Ladefoged.22  
Fast-forward to 2009, when the National Research Council 
came out with another devastating report, this time concerning 
forensic identification science in the United States more 
generally. The report decried the absence of scientific integrity 
in forensic identification procedures, much as the earlier report 
did with respect to speaker identification technology used at the 
time:  
A body of research is required to establish the limits and 
measures of performance and to address the impact of 
sources of variability and potential bias. Such research is 
sorely needed, but it seems to be lacking in most of the 
forensic disciplines that rely on subjective assessments of 
matching characteristics. These disciplines need to 
develop rigorous protocols to guide these subjective 
interpretations and pursue equally rigorous research and 
evaluation programs.23 
Yet now, it is not the linguistic academic community taking 
the lead in remedying this situation on behalf of linguists who do 
not want to see the legal system making excessive claims about 
the forensic application of the language sciences. Rather, it is 
chiefly legal academics with expertise in the area of scientific 
evidence taking the lead, with the focus not on linguistics in 
particular but on the forensic identification sciences generally.24 
What has happened between 1979 and 2009? In 1979, there was 
no field of forensic linguistics, or at least not much of one. 
Linguists were occasionally called to testify as experts in court, 
but they did so because their academic expertise serendipitously 
crossed paths with a legal issue, much the way an academic 
physicist or engineer might be called upon to provide expert 
testimony. Linguists were in the business of being linguists, and 
                                                          
22 See SOLAN & TIERSMA, supra note 18, at 140–41. 
23 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING 
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 8 (2009). 
24 See, e.g., Jonathan J. Koehler, If the Shoe Fits They Might Acquit: The 
Value of Forensic Science Testimony, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 21 
(2011); Risinger et al., supra note 16; Sanders, supra note 15. 
560 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
the legal system was as much a novelty to them as they were a 
novelty to the legal system. As late as 1994, Judith Levi, one of 
the founders of the field of forensic linguistics, wrote the 
inaugural article in the then-brand-new journal Forensic 
Linguistics (now, The International Journal of Speech, Language 
and the Law), explaining to the linguistics community at large 
the growing acceptance of linguistic experts in court.25 
Since that time, things have developed considerably. With 
the growth of undergraduate and graduate programs in forensic 
linguistics,26 many academics devote much of their time to 
applying linguistic knowledge in legal settings, as do consulting 
linguists without academic affiliations. The gap between the 
academic community that once policed its field for abuse by the 
legal system and practitioners within the legal system has shrunk 
considerably.  
Some in the language and law community have recognized 
this gap between theory and practice to be a healthy one and 
have attempted to maintain it in their description of how 
linguists engaged in courtroom testimony should view their 
work. Peter Tiersma, a law professor and linguist (with whom I 
frequently write), suggests that the field is at its best when the 
reluctant scholar is asked to share her expertise with the court 
for the benefit of reaching a proper result in a dispute in which 
the expert has no interest, either intellectual or otherwise.27 
Roger Shuy, a distinguished scholar in applied linguistics who 
has been a prolific writer in the field, states the forensic 
linguist’s ideal role more fully:  
[Forensic linguistics] has become a useful way to refer to 
the use of linguistics knowledge where there are data that 
                                                          
25 See Judith N. Levi, Language as Evidence: The Linguist as Expert 
Witness in North American Courts, 1 FORENSIC LINGUISTICS 1 (1994). For 
subsequent history, see Peter M. Tiersma & Lawrence M. Solan, The 
Linguist on the Witness Stand: Forensic Linguistics in American Courts, 78 
LANGUAGE 221 (2002).  
26 Such programs exist at Cardiff University, Aston University 
(Birmingham, UK), Universitat Pomeu Fabra (Barcelona), and Hofstra 
University. 
27 Peter M. Tiersma, Linguistic Issues in the Law, 69 LANGUAGE 113, 
122 (1993). 
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serve as evidence. But I have some concerns about the 
term itself, because it seems that when one does 
“forensic linguistics” one is simply doing linguistics, a 
type of applied linguistics, in fact.28 
These views are attractive. To the extent that they are 
descriptively accurate views of the field, they explain how it was 
that the academic phoneticians were the ones who shut down the 
voiceprint craze of the 1960s and ‘70s.  
Now, however, expert testimony on questions of language 
goes beyond ordinary research in linguistics into areas developed 
by those interested in forensic linguistics as its own discipline.29 
Individuals, sometimes without a great deal of training in 
linguistics, generally become skilled in areas of language 
analysis developed particularly for consumption by the legal 
community.30 For reasons stated earlier, many practitioners have 
little motivation to police their own methodologies along the 
conventional scientific criteria of validity and reliability and 
typically do not engage in analysis of methods used by others, 
apart from disagreement within a particular case in which they 
have taken opposing positions. The result of this development is 
that it is not always possible to judge forensic testimony against 
ordinary practices among linguists, because linguists do not 
ordinarily engage in the activities that generate the expert 
testimony. 
Does this amount to an ethical issue? It probably does if 
neither methodological testing nor proven individual proficiency 
forms a sufficient scientific basis to accept some of what passes 
for linguistic expertise. Moreover, to the extent that this lack of 
foundation results from the dearth of research that is itself a 
product of this conflict, then it is the fruit of a conflict of 
interest and is an ethical issue for this reason. Law professor 
and philosopher Susan Haack puts it this way:  
                                                          
28 ROGER W. SHUY, LINGUISTICS IN THE COURTROOM: A PRACTICAL 
GUIDE 3 (2006).  
29 See Ronald R. Butters, The Forensic Linguist’s Professional 
Credentials, 16 INT’L J. SPEECH LANGUAGE & L. 237 (2009). 
30 Contra SHUY, supra note 28, at 3. 
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 Distinguishing genuine inquiry, the real thing, from 
pseudo-inquiry or “sham reasoning,” C.S. Peirce—a 
working scientist as well as the greatest of American 
philosophers—wrote that “the spirit . . . is the most 
essential thing—the motive”; that genuine inquiry consists 
in “actually drawing the bow upon truth with intentness 
in the eye, with energy in the arm.” For the same 
reason, I am tempted to write of advocacy “research” (in 
scare quotes); for it is something of a stretch to call 
advocacy research “research” at all. Advocacy 
“research” is like inquiry insofar as it involves seeking 
out evidence. But it is part of an advocacy project insofar 
as it involves seeking out evidence favoring a 
predetermined conclusion; and it is undertaken in the 
spirit, from the motive, of an advocate. In short, it is a 
kind of pseudo-inquiry.31 
At the same time, as noted previously, there is no reason to 
conclude that intuitive expertise based on experience and insight 
fares any better or worse than does algorithmic expertise. 
Intuitive expertise is not necessarily unreliable. On the contrary, 
it is clear that at least in some settings, people are able to form 
sophisticated mental models of situations about which they are 
experts and to weigh relevant factors with great accuracy, 
notwithstanding that they are unable to describe how they did it. 
For example, Malcolm Gladwell, in his book Blink, made 
famous the story of the J. Paul Getty Museum’s acquisition of a 
2,000-year-old Greek sculpture—a kouros—which is a rare thing 
to acquire.32 The museum did its due diligence carefully, 
investigating the sculpture’s provenance over the centuries, 
engaging experts to examine the marble with microscopes, and 
so on.33 But the day of reckoning came when the museum’s 
curator began inviting various experts in classical sculpture, 
none of whom felt that the sculpture was authentic, and one of 
whom remarked that seeing it caused in him a wave of “intuitive 
                                                          
31 Susan Haack, What’s Wrong with Litigation-Driven Science? An Essay 
in Legal Epistemology, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1053, 1071 (2008). 
32 MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK 3 (2005). 
33 Id. at 3–4. 
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repulsion.”34 For the most part, the experts could not put into 
words exactly what was bothering them, but deep within 
themselves, they knew.35 Later, all agreed that the kouros was a 
kouros copy.36  
The kouros story is particularly relevant here because it is, 
in a sense, a matter of authorship attribution: who sculpted the 
kouros that the museum had bought? Thus, we may wish to ask 
about the nature of the knowledge that the experts brought with 
them to the task that led to their negative reactions. As Daniel 
Kahneman points out,37 celebrations of gut-reaction decision 
making, such as Malcolm Gladwell’s Blink, also contain stories 
of terrible diagnostic failure, including the misdiagnosis of heart 
attacks.38 And we’ve already seen how well political experts do 
at predicting election results. Many in the business of predicting 
the future of the economy are on a par with the political pundits. 
It thus appears that intuitive expertise is neither all good nor all 
bad as a diagnostic tool.39 
Psychologists have devoted a great deal of study to the 
question of expert intuition, in areas as diverse as the thinking of 
chess masters, medical diagnosis and treatment by physicians, 
neonatal intensive care nursing, and decision making about 
firefighting.40 What appears to separate the intuitive experts from 
the rest of us is a deep base of knowledge that has enabled them 
to build mental models41 that are so robust that they can be both 
accessed and expanded with ease. Chess masters do far better 
                                                          
34 Id. at 5–6. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 7. 
37 DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 235–36 (2011). 
38 GLADWELL, supra note 32, at 130. 
39 For a discussion of how scientific analysis and subjective analysis 
blend in diagnosis in many domains, see John A. Swets et al., Psychological 
Science Can Improve Diagnostic Decisions, 1 PSYCHOL. SCI. IN PUB. 
INTEREST 1 (2000).  
40 For discussion of the circumstances in which intuitive expertise is most 
likely to prevail, see Daniel Kahneman & Gary Klein, Conditions of Intuitive 
Expertise: A Failure to Disagree, 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 515, 522 (2009).  
41 For an overview of what constitutes a mental model, see P.N. 
JOHNSON-LAIRD, MENTAL MODELS 10–12 (1983). 
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than do novices in recalling the pieces in familiar chess 
configurations but generally do not do significantly better in 
recalling the pieces placed at random on a chess board.42 
Moreover, the more such configurations are familiar to them—
because they devote their lives to studying these configurations—
the broader the range of improved recall.43 By the same token, 
experienced doctors, when asked the basis of a diagnosis, do not 
resort to basic science, even though they were taught and know 
the mechanisms underlying disease. In a hard case they may 
resort to their basic training, but as a general matter, they have 
developed, based on huge numbers of observations, a wealth of 
knowledge of what combinations of symptoms and conditions 
are indicative of disease and can do this with great accuracy, 
even when they are not able to articulate how it is that they 
assigned particular weights to particular symptoms in a 
particular setting.44 And the same holds true for the impressive 
record of neonatal intensive care nurses, fire commanders, and 
other such experts.45 Each group of experts develops mental 
models capable of distinguishing the successful from the 
unsuccessful based upon repeated exposures to a wealth of 
scenarios. 
Thus, while Lacy relies upon intuitive judgment more than 
does Lucy, depending upon how conservative Lacy is in her 
willingness to offer expert opinions, her rate of error may be 
lower than that of Lucy. Yet, when given a choice, the legal 
system typically opts for Lucy-like expertise, not because we 
know that she is more likely to be correct, but because we at 
least know how likely she is to be right, reducing the probability 
                                                          
42 Gobet & Charness, supra note 9, at 526–27. 
43 Id. at 526. Nonetheless, the machines have caught up to and passed 
the chess masters. For an interesting account, see SILVER, supra note 8, at 
262–93 (describing Garry Kasparov’s games with computer chess programs 
during the 1980s and 90s and his eventual loss to Deep Blue in 1997). 
44 Norman et al., supra note 10, at 346. 
45 For a description of some of this research and a theory of what makes 
intuitive expertise successful in these circumstances, see Karol G. Ross et al., 
Professional Judgments and “Naturalistic Decision Making,” in THE 
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF EXPERTISE AND EXPERT PERFORMANCE, supra 
note 9, at 403, 403–15. 
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that cognitive biases or a witness’s compelling personality will 
play too great a role in the outcome of a case.46 Making the case 
for algorithmic expertise more compelling, people are much 
better at recognizing the biases of others than they are at 
recognizing their own biases.47 Thus, encouraging experts to 
recognize and stave off the temptation of becoming too much a 
team player is not likely to be an adequate solution to the 
problem of bias. 
The literature on the nature of intuitive expertise raises 
another concern with respect to authorship attribution. Expert 
opinion testimony is admissible only if the expert’s scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.48 
It is not clear how much of the expert opinion of intuitive 
experts on authorship attribution is a matter of expertise. To see 
why this is the case, let us look at a Lacy-like analysis taken 
from an article by Australian linguist Robert Eagelson.49 
Eagleson describes a case in which a woman supposedly left a 
farewell letter to her husband, typed on the family typewriter, 
when she ran off with another man.50 The police believed, 
however, that the husband had written the letter, and had done 
away with the wife.51 A linguist was called in to compare the 
style of the farewell letter with the style of writing of documents 
known to be written by the husband and documents known to 
the written by the wife.52 
                                                          
46 See Joseph Sanders, Kumho and How We Know, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 373, 374–75, 393 (2001). The propensity to overstate the role of 
character and to understate the circumstances in which an individual acts is 
called “the correspondence bias” in the psychological literature. See Daniel 
T. Gilbert & Patrick S. Malone, The Correspondence Bias, 117 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 21 (1995); see also SOLAN & TIERSMA, supra note 18, at 29–32 
(discussing evidentiary standards in the Daubert age). 
47 Emily Pronin et al., The Bias Blind Spot: Perception of Bias in Self 
and Others, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369, 369–81 (2002). 
48 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
49 Robert Eagleson, Forensic Analysis of Personal Written Texts: A Case 
Study, in LANGUAGE AND THE LAW 362 (John Gibbons ed., 1994). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
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The results were dramatic. The husband’s known writings 
and the farewell letter shared a number of nonstandard spellings 
(individual words, capitalization of common nouns, lower case 
proper nouns, use of apostrophe), syntactic structures, word 
structures, and punctuation nuances.53 The wife’s writings had 
none of these features.54 To take one example, both the 
husband’s writings and the farewell letter used the present tense 
when it would have been appropriate to use the past tense (“He 
threaten me.”).55 After the results of this analysis were presented 
to the husband, he confessed.56  
But there is a problem here. The grouping of similarities and 
differences indeed requires some sophistication in the analysis of 
language. It is unlikely that someone not trained in linguistics 
would have come up with this array. Once the linguistic expert 
did so, however, there was no particular science behind the 
inference that the husband was more likely than the wife to have 
written the farewell letter. It only makes sense given the array 
of similarities with the husband’s style and differences from the 
wife’s, but it makes sense because of what our common sense 
notions tell us about how likely people are to be consistent about 
such aspects of their writing. Missing is the kind of experience 
that the doctors, neonatal nurses, chess players, and others 
describe in which the similar patterns are presented to them over 
and over again with the results known quickly. Other Lacy-like 
examples show the same characteristics—a substantial, and often 
intuitively convincing, number of similarities between a 
questioned document and the writings of a suspect, with no 
serious science underlying the inference of authorship 
identification.57 
This leaves the legal system with three choices: it can accept 
the expert testimony, opinion and all; it can reject the expert 
testimony on similarities and differences entirely; or it can admit 
                                                          
53 Id. at 371–72. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 367–68. 
56 Id. at 373. 
57 See, for example, the discussion of the Unabomber case in SOLAN & 
TIERSMA, supra note 18, at 159–64. 
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the testimony, but permit the jury to draw the inferences of 
identity for which there is not an adequate scientific basis. Each 
of these options has its own difficulties. 
The problem with the first option is that there is no basis for 
crediting the opinion of the expert. In the next section, I 
recommend proficiency testing to legitimize expert testimony in 
these circumstances.  
The second option, while seemingly attractive, especially to 
those who favor an algorithmic approach, also comes with a 
price. It takes from the jury the ability to evaluate evidence with 
more sophistication. Take, for example, a point raised by 
Malcolm Coulthard58: the government offers evidence in a fraud 
case that a letter whose authorship is in question contains the 
same kinds of linguistic nuances (spelling errors, punctuation, 
and so on) as do the known writings of the defendant.59 No 
expert is needed.60 Now, the defense offers an expert to 
demonstrate that these same features are present in the writings 
of other possible authors.61 Only the expert conducted the 
evaluation of the documents, so without his testimony, they will 
not be before the jury.62 It would seem that justice is better 
served if the expert is permitted to point out similarities with 
other potential authors, regardless of there being no algorithm 
that can demonstrate a likelihood of actual authorship. After all, 
that is exactly what the prosecution has done without an expert 
in its efforts to implicate the defendant. 
The third option—permitting the expert to point out 
similarities and differences, but not to issue an opinion on 
attribution—also has its problems. The approach has initial 
appeal. On the one hand, the comparison seems to be relevant to 
the outcome. On the other hand, we have no way of knowing 
how good the expert’s lay intuitions are likely to be. No studies 
have been conducted to tell us. They may be right most of the 
                                                          
58 Malcolm Coulthard, On Admissible Linguistic Evidence, 21 J.L. & 
POL’Y 441 (2013). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
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time when so many features are either shared or differentiated, 
but we simply do not know. In a different context, I 
recommended that courts accept a “tour guide” approach to 
expert linguists testifying about meaning.63 When each side 
appears to have proposed a reasonable interpretation of legally 
relevant language, a linguist may point out the various plausible 
interpretations and explain how they derive from ordinary 
linguistic processes.64 This kind of testimony poses little danger, 
since the judge and jury are perfectly capable, based on their 
intuitions as speakers of English, to determine whether the 
linguist’s testimony accurately reflects their own judgments 
about the range of possible meanings.65 Moreover, once the 
range of plausible interpretations is brought out, the linguist’s 
expert opinion about meaning is largely superfluous, since the 
expert will have put the jury on an equal footing with him by 
virtue of the testimony.66  
Authorship attribution is different, however. The goal of the 
expert is not to make jurors sensitive to the full range of their 
intuitions about authorship but rather to determine who wrote 
the questioned document. We do not know, however, to what 
extent the expert testimony on similarities and differences is 
helpful and how much it leads jurors to intuitive judgment 
without adequate basis to determine whether the similarities and 
differences that appear so telling have any real predictive force. 
Thus, as Edward Cheng points out, “[t]he heavy-lifting in 
developing an authorship attribution technique should occur in 
the lab, long before it is applied in a legal case.”67 While that is 
happening, however, courts are faced with the uncomfortable 
dilemmas described above. Let us now turn to how the 
American legal system has reacted to these issues and how the 
field might develop to increase its efficacy in court. 
                                                          
63 Lawrence M. Solan, Linguistic Experts as Semantic Tour Guides, 5 
FORENSIC LINGUISTICS 87 (1998). 
64 Id. at 94–95. 
65 Id. at 95. 
66 Id. at 92. 
67 Edward K. Cheng, Being Pragmatic About Forensic Linguistics, 21 
J.L. & POL’Y 541, 550 (2013). 
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III. JUDICIAL REACTIONS TO AUTHORSHIP ATTRIBUTION 
EVIDENCE 
This section comments on what the American courts have 
been saying about authorship identification expertise in the 
United States. However, as Peter Tiersma and I have pointed 
out,68 relying upon published opinions to draw conclusions about 
evidentiary decisions by American courts is not likely to present 
a fair sense of what actually happens in trial courts. The case 
law provides a very deferential approach to appeals of decisions 
on the admissibility of expert opinion evidence,69 and most (but 
not all) of the appeals will occur in the context of the losing 
party having been denied in their application to have an expert 
testify. The result is that most evidentiary decisions in published 
opinions by appellate courts are affirmances of the decision of 
the trial court to exclude an expert. An academic, or for that 
matter, a lawyer or judge, who relies on these opinions will not 
have any idea in how many cases experts have indeed testified at 
trial. Yet such testimony will occur when both sides call experts 
on the same issue, when one side calls an expert without 
objection from the other side, or when the offer of an expert 
survives a motion to exclude, but the case does not result in a 
published opinion, at least not on that issue. 
Prominent examples have appeared in the press in 2011 and 
2012. For example, Robert Leonard and Ronald Butters each 
testified in the Chicago murder case, People v. Coleman.70 
Coleman was accused of killing his wife.71 Part of the 
prosecution’s story was that he had written various threat letters, 
one of them painted as graffiti on a wall.72 Leonard, testifying as 
part of the prosecution’s case, was permitted to opine that the 
                                                          
68 Solan & Tiersma, supra note 18. 
69 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139 (1997). 
70 People v. Coleman, No. 09-CF-50 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Monroe Cnty. May 5, 
2011). 
71 Nicholas Pistor, Jurors Shown Images of Coleman’s Dead Family as 
Trial Starts, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Apr. 25, 2011, 2:15 PM), 
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/Illinois/jurors-shown-images-of-coleman-
s-dead-family-as-trial-article_c293b985-a54c-5be1-8540-5c4b7a98432d.html. 
72 Id. 
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stylistic features of the threat letters had enough in common to 
suggest that all were written by the same individual and that the 
letters bore enough similarity to the known writings of Coleman 
that it was a reasonable—but not proven—hypothesis that 
Coleman wrote them.73 Butters argued that there was not enough 
evidence to permit one to draw legitimate inferences.74 Coleman 
was convicted.75 As an aside, the circumstantial evidence was 
strong: Coleman had bought the paint that was used to write the 
threat on the wall, and the other letters were found on his 
computer.76 Thus, the linguistic debate was offered only to dispel 
the possibility that someone other than Coleman had used his 
computer. Nonetheless, the Coleman case demonstrates an 
instance in which courts permitted forensic stylistic analysis after 
ruling it admissible in an evidentiary hearing.  
Also in the press were stories about an expert declaration by 
Gerald McMenamin, a linguist who specializes in forensic 
stylistic analysis. McMenamin testified in a case brought by Paul 
Ceglia against Mark Zuckerberg, claiming that Zuckerberg did 
not own the Facebook idea.77 McMenamin opined that certain 
emails allegedly written by Zuckerberg were in fact not written 
by Zuckerberg. The methods he used have drawn criticism from 
Professor Butters78 and some controversy in the press.79 
Nonetheless, in an opinion issued but not published as of the 
                                                          
73 Report of Proceedings, May 3, 2011, Coleman, No. 09-CF-50 
(testimony of Robert A. Leonard). 
74 Report of Proceedings, Apr. 4, 2011, Coleman, No. 09-CF-50 
(testimony of Ronald Butters, opposing the admission of Leonard as an expert 
witness). 
75 Jim Suhr, Christopher Coleman, Former Marine, Convicted of Killing 
Wife, 2 Sons, HUFFINGTON POST (May 6, 2011, 11:15 AM), 
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460.html. 
76 Id. 
77 Decl. of Gerald R. McMenamin in Support of Motion for Expedited 
Discovery, Ceglia v. Zuckerberg, No. 1:2010-cv-00569 (W.D.N.Y. July 9, 
2010), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-
york/nywdce/1:2010cv00569/79861/50/0.pdf?1307100528. 
78 Butters, supra note 12, at 354–56. 
79 See Ben Zimmer, Decoding Your E-Mail Personality, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 24, 2011, at SR12. 
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time of this writing, a federal Magistrate Judge has credited 
McMenamin’s position80 and recommended that the district court 
dismiss the case against Zuckerberg and Facebook.81 
McMenamin has testified in authorship cases on many 
occasions, and in fact has written a book that describes his 
stylistic approach.82 But, unless and until the Magistrate Judge’s 
opinion (or another opinion discussing McMenamin’s 
contribution) in the Facebook litigation is published, he shows 
up in the federal and state reporters only indirectly, through a 
former FBI agent and forensic linguist named James Fitzgerald. 
In a 2010 federal case decided by the District Court in Utah,83 
and a case decided by the federal court in New Jersey in 2000,84 
Fitzgerald testified in a Daubert hearing that he was employing 
McMenamin’s methods in an authorship attribution case.85 In 
both cases the court permitted him to testify as to similarities 
and differences between the defendant’s known writings and 
those that were in question in the case but not to offer an 
opinion as to authorship because the methods did not meet the 
scientific standard required by the Federal Rules of Evidence.86 
In contrast, an appellate opinion of the New Jersey state 
courts affirmed a conviction in a case in which Fitzgerald 
testified for the prosecution that the defendant had written 
certain anonymous documents, and Carole Chaski testified that 
there were significant differences between the anonymous 
documents and those known to be written by the defendant.87 
The defendant was actually acquitted of having created the 
                                                          
80 Ceglia v. Zuckerberg, No. 1:2010-cv-00569, at 118–19 (W.D.N.Y. 
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anonymous documents.88 The matter of fact discussion by the 
appellate court, however, suggests no problem with trial judges 
admitting expert testimony of forensic linguists, including 
opinion as to authorship, whether they conduct their work 
through stylistic comparison or by virtue of algorithms that they 
have developed. When one party decides to deal with the other 
side’s expert by hiring his own, there will typically be no 
rejection of either expert. Judges are not likely to exclude a 
witness absent an objection from the opposing party. Moreover, 
unless the case results in a published decision, there will be no 
publicly salient record of the entire episode. In fact, the court in 
this case mentioned the forensic linguistic testimony only as an 
aside, since the defendant had been acquitted on the count for 
which the testimony was offered. 
My goal in this discussion is not to criticize the linguists 
whose methods were at issue in these cases. On the contrary, 
much of this essay is devoted to suggesting that stylistic analysis 
is not provably less reliable than the quantitative methods. My 
hope is that through communication among those who approach 
the field from different perspectives, it becomes possible to 
make such methods crisp enough to withstand scrutiny or at least 
to integrate their most acute insights into quantitative models.  
IV. CURRENT TRENDS IN FORENSIC LINGUISTIC AUTHORSHIP 
ATTRIBUTION 
The field appears to be developing to bring a healthy balance 
between theory and practice in forensic linguistic identification. 
The basic problem that the field must address is this: as we 
learned from Noam Chomsky more than a half century ago, 
language is a creative cognitive function.89 By that, I do not 
mean to say that we can all be poets if we wish. What 
“creative” in this context means is that we can produce and 
understand infinitely many utterances because the rules of a 
recursive grammar that we have internalized in our minds, 
mostly as young children, combined with a rich vocabulary, give 
                                                          
88 Id. at 420. 
89 NOAM CHOMSKY, LANGUAGE AND MIND 88–91 (3d ed. 2006). 
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us the capacity to do this. And we indeed use the capacity. As 
Malcolm Coulthard has pointed out, based on the work of some 
computational linguists,90 if you highlight any ten-word string 
from any document, and then paste that string into a search 
engine (e.g., Google) or database (e.g., Lexis) window, you will 
find that your string is unique among the vast array of 
documents available.91 This shows enormous intra-authorial 
variation in the use of language. We really do not say things the 
same way twice. What this all means is that the challenge facing 
authorship attribution research is to discover ways in which the 
variation in the use of language between authors is demonstrably 
greater than the variation within a particular author and to focus 
on the presence or absence of these distinguishing features.  
As noted, there seems to be a methodological, and for that 
matter, cultural division between computational and stylistic 
analysts, with the former approaching authorship attribution 
problems in a manner more consistent with conventional views 
of expert testimony than the latter but with no evidence that 
either approach does a better job. Three things are likely to 
bring about a convergence. First, I expect that if the 
computational approaches reach some level of maturity and 
consensus, they will be far more often accepted by the courts 
than those approaches based largely on intuition—even excellent 
intuition based on experience and learning. Computational 
linguistics is an established subfield of linguistic inquiry. Thus, 
it really is possible to apply well-known linguistic techniques to 
a forensic problem and to ask whether the application in the 
forensic setting meets the standards of the field itself.92 By the 
                                                          
90 Fintan Culwin & Mike Child, Optimising and Automating the Choice 
of Search Strings when Investigating Possible Plagiarism, PROC. 4TH INT’L 
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92 See Argamon & Koppel, supra note 17; Carole E. Chaski, Best 
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same token, computational linguists and computer scientists are 
accustomed to testing their algorithms to see how well they work 
and reporting the rate of error. One conference, for example, 
requires the submission of an answer to an authorship attribution 
task as a criterion for participation.93 These procedures are 
consistent with contemporary views of acceptable scientific 
evidence.94 If judges, at least in the United States, begin to 
accept authorship identification as a routine matter precisely 
because it is transparently algorithmic, with identifiable rates of 
error, then such work will become the standard. 
Second, it will be incumbent upon those whose work is more 
intuitively stylistic to demonstrate its scientific underpinnings. 
This can be accomplished by incorporating stylistic features into 
the computational algorithms being developed by computational 
linguists and computer scientists. The insightful observations of 
stylistic analysts that take advantage of such nuances as word 
choice, punctuation, and spelling errors can be used to expand 
the range of factors that computer scientists include in their 
models, with the potential of adding power, even if only 
incrementally. In fact, this is already occurring.95 Progress can 
also be made through the creation of models that demonstrate 
the efficacy of stylistic analysis as its own approach. Tim Grant, 
in his article in this volume, has taken a significant step in that 
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93 The PAN Lab, held in conjunction with the CLEF conference, is 
referred to in the field as PAN/CLEF. Plagiarism Detection, PAN, 
http://pan.webis.de/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2013). 
94 See SOLAN & TIERSMA, supra note 18, at 29–32. 
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direction.96 This will no doubt require far more collaboration 
between the forensic linguistic community and those adept at 
statistical modeling. Such collaboration has not been adequate to 
date. Many of the questions that Butters raises (such as how 
large an effect must be for it to merit evidentiary weight) are 
answered automatically in computational settings by virtue of the 
models employed. Similarly, for those engaged in the promising 
methods of using linguistic corpora as reference sets in 
authorship attribution,97 collaboration with modelers will become 
a necessity. 
In the short run, proficiency testing may substitute for the 
development of methods, although this remains a second-best 
solution because it does not eliminate the potential for bias in 
actual case work. Those linguists who demonstrate their ability 
to identify authorship correctly in a series of problems presented 
to them would be credited in court for their proven prowess 
irrespective of whether their methods are replicable. The 
PAN/CLEF conference mentioned above,98 in which computer 
scientists test their methods against each other as a prerequisite 
for participation in the event, might be expanded to include 
those who analyze authorship cases through stylistic comparison. 
This is an especially appealing solution in that it may well be the 
case that the stylistic analysts are highly accurate in their 
conclusions. Personal communication with some of the 
organizers of this conference suggests that they would be 
enthusiastic about such participation. It is also important, of 
course, that those whose work depends on algorithms be willing 
to subject their models to testing of the sort described above. 
Self-proclaimed excellence is no more scientific when asserted 
by computer scientists than when asserted by stylistic analysts.  
Third, and related to my second point, some computer 
scientists and some linguists have taken to looking at very large 
sets of features, largely stylistic markers, not concerning 
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themselves with which features appear relevant in a particular 
case, as long as enough do. One such research project uses 
cluster analysis to sort through a large corpus of emails and to at 
least reduce the pool of potential authors from a great many to a 
few with considerable accuracy.99 Tim Grant’s work also makes 
use of “a basket of features,” concerning itself more with the 
number of features in common than with whether a particular 
feature or kind of feature is likely to be predictive across 
cases.100 
Whether I am right or wrong in predicting the subsequent 
direction of the field, I firmly believe that far more collaboration 
among scholars with different areas of expertise is absolutely 
essential. And I would like nothing more than to see a 
significant increase in collaboration notwithstanding any conflicts 
experienced by the players and without a precipitating crisis. 
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